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Abstract
Data-Driven Approach for Automatic Telephony Threat Analysis and Campaign Detection
Houssem Eddine Bordjiba
The growth of the telephone network and the availability of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
have both contributed to the availability of a flexible and easy to use artifact for users, but also to a
significant increase in cyber-criminal activity. These criminals use emergent technologies to conduct
illegal and suspicious activities. For instance, they use VoIP’s flexibility to abuse and scam victims.
A lot of interest has been expressed into the analysis and assessment of telephony cyber-threats. A
better understanding of these types of abuse is required in order to detect, mitigate, and attribute
these attacks. The purpose of this research work is to generate relevant and timely telephony abuse
intelligence that can support the mitigation and/or the investigation of such activities. To achieve this
objective, we present, in this thesis, the design and implementation of a Telephony Abuse Intelligence
Framework (TAINT) that automatically aggregates, analyzes and reports on telephony abuse activities.
Such a framework monitors and analyzes, in near-real-time, crowd-sourced telephony complaints
data from various sources. We deploy our framework on a large dataset of telephony complaints,
spanning over seven years, to provide in-depth insights and intelligence about emerging telephony
threats. The framework presented in this thesis is of a paramount importance when it comes to the
mitigation, the prevention and the attribution of telephony abuse incidents. We analyze the data and
report on the complaint distribution, the used numbers and the spoofed callers’ identifiers. In addition,
we identify and geo-locate the sources of the phone calls, and further investigate the underlying
telephony threats. Moreover, we quantify the similarity between reported phone numbers to unveil
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The Internet is commonly used by cyber-criminals to exploit the users through emails, social media
networks or other vulnerabilities. However, in recent years, cyber criminals started using another
channel to reach their victims, namely the telephony network. Being a well-established and more
secure service compared to Internet, the use of telephony for different purposes has increased.
However, its service is now being abused to perpetrate various cybercrime attacks. Furthermore,
Internet telephony offers a plethora of options for cyber criminals to generate noisy bulk calls,
which results in disrupting telephony services as well as targeting people to monetize their activities.
Therefore, efficient forms of unsolicited telemarketing and vishing (voice-phishing) campaigns,
involving interactive voice response and dialing algorithms, have emerged. In addition, the trivial
use of SMS/MMS messages has given the telephony abuse an epidemic trend, encouraging the
propagation of scamming campaigns as well as phishing mobile technology users. Based on these
facts, uncovering the key players behind telephony abuses is a real challenge, especially since abusers
hide themselves behind anonymity services [58].
A better understanding of these types of abuses is required for detection, mitigation and attribution
purposes. One way to gain such an understanding is to rely on the complaints filed by the victims to
government agencies and telephony service providers.
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According to [14], US government revealed receiving more than 5.3 million telephony abuse com-
plaints in 2016. Based on this report, more than 226 million phone numbers were registered on the
Do Not Call Registry list as not to receive telemarketing calls. The complaint data provides valuable
information for investigators such as the nature and the type of the abuse. In this context, we have
developed a framework that automatically collects, analyzes and reports on abuse activities. Such
a framework monitors and analyzes, in near-real-time, complaints data from multiple sources. By
doing so, the telephony abuse intelligence framework generates complete abuse intelligence that can
support mitigation and/or investigation activities.
We subject to analysis the large dataset of telephony complaints in order to provide in-depth
insights and intelligence on these emerging telephony threats. In real world scenarios, such analysis
is highly beneficial to both incident handlers and law enforcement officials to cope with telephony
abuse incidents.
1.2 Problem Statement
Recently, we have witnessed a significant rise in telephony abuse. In 2016, according to [28], Ameri-
cans lost 9.5 billion dollars due to phone scams. These losses are the result of scamming campaigns
that targeted approximately thirty-two million telephone customers. Additionally, fraudsters have
been impersonating government agencies and well-known companies to craft their attacks. For
example, in April 2017, fraudsters intimidated and scammed a telephone customer by impersonating
her bank [60]. According to [47], fraudsters posed as the IRS and threatened the customers with
police involvement and possible imprisonment if the person does not pay the fake tax statements.
Consequently, twelve Nebrasken inhabitants lost $56,000 due to this telephone scam [1]. The victims
reported that the criminals created a believable scam by assigning the caller ID of IRS to their number
and using the victims personal information. Therefore, it is of a paramount importance to design and
implement a telephony abuse intelligence framework that will provide assistance in the detection,
mitigation and attribution of scamming campaigns. In this respect, we aim to answer the following
research questions:
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(1) How to collect data about telephony abuse and how to analyze it to derive situational awareness
and insights about the different telephony scams?
(2) How to generate timely and relevant intelligence about telephony abuses that can be used for
detection, mitigation and attribution purposes?
(3) How to analyze the collected data to timely detect the different scamming campaigns that are
taking place on the telephony network?
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
To address the aforementioned research questions, we design and implement a framework that is
capable of collecting, in near-real-time, telephony complaints data and analyze it to generate timely
and relevant intelligence on telephony abuse activities. The main benefits of our framework are: (i)
Near-real-time and worldwide situational awareness on telephony abuse activities; (ii) Generation
of profiling information on top abusers by calling identifiers, service providers, and geo-locations;
(iii) Identification of scamming and tele-marketing campaigns by exploring the similarities of the
attributes underlying telephony abuse activities. Our analysis relies on using multiple data mining
and machine learning techniques and the correlation of the data with external databases, such as
the Canadian Numbering Administrator database [19] and the North American Numbering Plan
Administration database [41] to enrich the open-source collected data, then profiling different phone
abuse activities together with the underlying campaigns.
The main differentiating factors of our proposal with respect to the state-of-the-art contributions
are: (i) We rely on multiple source raw data and publicly available telephony databases; (ii) We
use larger datasets compared to [36, 24]. Indeed, we used a dataset that is comprised of 5 million
complaints whereas [36] used only a dataset of 300 complaints which they collected using their own
developed web application; (iii) Our framework is an automatic and online solution, where a limited
human interaction is needed and it aggregates near-real-time data and generated near-real-time
intelligence whereas in [24] they had an automatic collection, yet an off-line analysis of the dataset
collected using a telephony honeypot; (iv) This is the very first research contribution, to the best of
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our knowledge, on the detection of telephony abuse campaigns by exploring the similarities between
the individual abuse incidents form telephony complaints data.
Our contributions are threefold:
(1) Design and implementation of a Telephony Abuse Intelligence Framework (TAINT)
We design and implement a framework that takes as input near-real-time open-source raw data
about telephony abuse and generates timely and relevant intelligence on abusers, the nature
of the abuse, the geo-locations, the call identifiers, etc. This generates important situational
awareness and insights about the ongoing worldwide abuses over the telephony network.
(2) Telephony abuse campaign detection We design and implement an algorithm that explores
the similarities between abuse incidents in order to detect, in near-real-time, orchestrated and
coordinated scamming and tele-marketing telephony campaigns.
(3) Evaluation of the system using real-world data We conduct a thorough evaluation of our
framework over a large dataset, which is comprised of 5 million abuse complains, spanning
over 7 years. It is important to mention that the derived intelligence is instrumental in the
detection, mitigation and attribution of telephony incidents. As such, it can be used by law-
enforcement officers to investigate the underlying incidents and attribute them. On the other
hand, it can be also used by telephony operators to mitigate telephony abuse activities.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information,
describes and analyzes the different telephony threats and presents a survey on some of the major
work done on telephony abuse analysis. In Chapter 3, we present a description of our telephony
complaints dataset. Then, we provide an overview of the architecture and design of our framework
together with the algorithmics of campaign detection. Moreover, in this chapter, we describe and
explain the back-end and front-end implementations of the proposed framework. Chapter 4, provides
an in-depth profiling of the telephony complaints data, which gives key insights about the telephony
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abuses. In addition, it presents an extensive evaluation of our framework with the underlying results.




Background & Related work
In this chapter, we present the definition of terms and essential concepts used in telephony abuse
analysis and investigation. In Section 2.1, we explain the technical terms that are used in this thesis.
In Section 2.2, we present an analysis of telephony threats. In Section 2.3, we provide the techniques
that are used by researchers and the security community to collect data and information about
telephony abuses. In Section 2.4, we give a brief description of the data mining and machine learning
techniques used in our work. Finally, in Section 2.5, we present an overview of the existing work
related to the analysis of telephony abuses.
2.1 Definitions
In this section, we describe the main technical terms that are used in this research work, namely VoIP,
Social Engineering, Robocalling, Toll Free Number, Caller ID or CNAM, and Caller ID spoofing.
2.1.1 Social Engineering
Cyber criminals use multiple techniques to make a fraud or to perpetrate their attacks. Usually, this
attacks have a schema composed of different steps needed to succeed in their attempt. The attacker
relies on two factors, the human factor and the technology factor. For the human factor, criminals use
Social Engineering which involves tricking people into performing specific actions that benefit the
attackers such as disclosing personal and private information or providing access to an unauthorized
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machine and so forth. Cyber criminals rely heavily on this technique in all types of cyber frauds and
in cyber attacks.
2.1.2 Robocalling
Robocalling involves prerecorded phone messages that are used to make automatic calls. This method
is usually used in telemarketing or political campaigns. Perpetrators leverage this option in telephony
network to generate telephony spams, to simplify the spread of their attacks, and to be able to commit
efficient phishing attacks.
2.1.3 Toll Free Number
Toll-Free Numbers are a particular phone numbers usually owned by businesses, government agencies,
or individuals that offer services to distant customers, as they have a particular billing system.
Contrary to the regular phone numbers, calls to toll-free numbers are charged on the callee rather
than the caller which can satisfy the need of enterprises to serve their customers without them having
to pay long distance calls. According to the Federal Communication Commission [4], in the USA,
specific Numbering Plan Area (NPA) Code are allocated to these Toll free numbers, which are
800, 888, 877, 866, 855 and 844.
2.1.4 Caller ID Name or CNAM
Caller Identification Name (Caller ID or CNAM) is a feature provided by telephone carriers to
identify the caller. Banks, government entities, companies, etc. use the Caller Identification to
authenticate themselves to their customers. This technology is very useful to both caller and callee;
however, the scammers can alter the Caller Identification to substitute their identity.
2.1.5 Caller ID Spoofing
The action of altering the Caller ID to reach a malicious goal is called Caller ID spoofing. Criminals
use this technique to deceive and scam their victims. The increase of telephony users and the
availability of the Smartphone, and the many features of Voice over IP contributed to the effectiveness
and the rise of this type of fraud [40].
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2.2 Telephony Threat Analysis
Throughout time, cyber criminals used different techniques to abuse their victims, including but not
limited to phishing (attempt to obtain sensitive information often for malicious reasons, by disguising
as a trustworthy entity), pharming (fraudulent practice of directing Internet users to a malicious
website that mimics the appearance of a legitimate one, in order to obtain sensitive information),
the use of spyware, the use of malware, etc. To execute their illegal plans, cyber criminals use
telephony as a new alternative medium to communicate with their victims. In the sequel, we present
the techniques that cyber criminals use to scam and abuse their victims throughout telephony lines.
Besides, scams of this kind are even more exacerbated with the large deployment of Voice over IP
(VoIP) services. The cheap and free telephone calls encouraged these criminals to use these attacks to
scam people by taking advantage of their trust of their seemingly-secure telephone services. Due to
the increasing prevalence of such attacks, [45] explains to telephone users how they can differentiate
between scammers and legitimate callers.
2.2.1 Voice Phishing or Vishing
Voice phishing, also known as vishing, is a technique used by criminals to scam and abuse telephone
users. This technique is derived from phishing on the Internet. Phishing is a type of Internet scam
where the attacker tries to impersonate a legal entity to steal Internet users’ information and then
use the information illegally. In essence, vishing is a form of phishing conducted through telephone
technologies. It consists of calling random people and claiming to be an enterprise or a legal company
in order to steal people’s personal information. It is also the technique of leveraging Internet telephony
technologies to craft a social engineering attack, by calling or sending a voice message to the victims
and asking them for personal information.
2.2.2 SMS Phishing
This is another form of phishing where the criminals pretend to be a bank or any legal entity.
They send to victims through SMS links to execute scripts or download malware on their mobile
phones. Afterwards, the attacker uses malware or scripts to collect sensitive information like banking
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credentials, credit cards, emails, contacts information and social insurance numbers. Smishing is
the act of phishing through short message services. Authorities have received a large volume of
complaints about such abuse [32].
2.2.3 Spam over Internet Telephony
The emergence and the huge recent advances in telephony technologies have also led to the appearance
of the spam over Internet telephony (SPIT). Criminals make a massive number of calls to victims to
mislead them into purchasing an abused service or brand items. Spammers use different features of
VoIP, such as interactive voice response, simultaneous calling, and many others to craft these attacks.
2.2.4 Telephony Denial of Service
Network denial of service attack is the act of flooding a victim’s network with illegitimate malicious
traffic to prevent real users from accessing it. Similarly, since organizations use telephone services to
promote and sell their products, criminals started to use Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attacks
against their victims. In such attacks, they flood their victim’s telephony network with a substantial
number of calls so as to make it unavailable (saturated) for some period of time, which results in
undesirable consequences, financial losses or even the endangerment of human lives [9].
2.2.5 Telephony Scam Examples
Debt Collector
Debt collector scams are used by some criminal organizations to call their victims and ask them to pay
money they do not actually owe [5]. These are actual scams as they are directed to debt-free persons,
as stated in [44]. The authors of these calls have abusive, aggressive, and harassing behaviors. In
Canada, according to the same source [7], various complaints have been filled by many people
to Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) and Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) against the perpetrators of such harassing phone calls. In [6], it is reported
that one of the big collection agencies in Canada was fined $500,000 after CRTC received many
complaints from users that have been harassed by automated phone calls without having debts.
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Telemarketer
Telemarketing calls can be divided into two types according to [56]: Regular telemarketers, which are
business companies that try to sell or promote their products by calling different potential customers,
and exempt telemarketers, which are political parties, charities, survey, research companies, etc. For
instance, in Canada, CRTC [3] defines how a person can make a complaint about a telemarketer if they
violates certain rules, mentioned in [48]. According to [24], telemarketers call customers, try to sell
their products and dial off when they feel that the deal will not work. However, from the complaints
that have been filed [43], we can see that abusers try to harass customers and steal their personal or
financial information such as their credit card numbers during these phone communications.
2.3 Telephony Abuse Datasets
The increasing damage caused by cyber criminals through telephony network in the last decade has
pushed researchers and security specialists to study and analyze telephony abusers activities. In this
pursuit, researchers used different techniques to collect relevant telephony abuse datasets, which
then became crucial to combat telephony abusers. Among the datasets used to infer intelligence
on telephony abuser’s exercises, there are manually collected datasets from telephony complaint
websites, and automatically collected datasets through built-in collection frameworks, honeypots, and
honeycards. In this section, we present different telephony abuse datasets, and the various techniques
used to generate and collect these datasets for research work and other aims.
2.3.1 Complaints Data
Complaint data is a valuable source of information for enterprises to improve their customers service
[22]. In our research, the complaint data refers to a set of complaints made by real world victims
regarding any given issue. The complaint contains different information about the victim, the abusers,
and the abuse. Researchers [24, 39] use this source of data to analyze and understand different abuses
for detection, prevention and mitigation purposes. For this thesis, the complaint data was obtained
from two different sources. The first one comes from the public complaint websites. The second one
comes from specialized collection frameworks built by researchers.
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Complaints Websites
Complaints websites are public websites that are created for the purpose of receiving complaints
from end-users. Telephony abuse complaints websites were used by researchers [24, 39] for the
analysis of telephony threats. These open source websites [43, 55, 35] contain valuable information
about the telephony abusers. Victims usually provide the phone number, the caller identification, and
a message describing the behavior of the caller.
Collection Frameworks
Collection frameworks are systems or web applications built by researchers and security professionals
to collect information about a given problem. The information collected through these systems allows
for the understanding of the nature of the problem and the behavior of the attackers, and helps to
further analyze this issue in order to improve future detection and prevention [36].
2.3.2 Honeypots
Telephony Honeypot
The telephony honeypot is a set of unassigned/unused phone numbers that collects data from various
telephony service providers. The telephony honeypot is a solution to collect abuse data over voice
channels. The information collected through this honeypot can be aggregated to identify trends and
provide insights into unsolicited calling patterns in order to better understand the origins of spoofed
calls and other telephony abuses. In addition, it helps in the early detection of telephony abuses and
helps to fingerprint malicious calls [24].
Mobile Telephony Honeypot
The Mobile telephony honeypot (MobiPot) is a honeypot made specifically to monitor and collect
data about abuses targeting mobile users. The drastic increase of mobile subscribers, which already
exceeded the world population, made mobile phones a great medium for cybercriminals to reach their
victims. In contrast to common telephony honeypots [24], MobiPot allows the security community
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to discover attacks targeting mobile phone numbers, in addition to its ability to have an automatic
engagement with the suspicious callers [12].
2.4 Data Mining
Data mining is the process of extracting valuable knowledge and information from a significant
amount of data. The term mining refers to the grave harvesting of data to extract valuable results.
In the literature, data mining is referred to as Knowledge discovery from data, which better reflects
the process and the objective of the technique [26]. The knowledge discovery process goes through
different stages: data cleaning, data integration, data selection, data transformation, knowledge
discovery, pattern evaluation and knowledge presentation. In this thesis, we have designed and
implemented our framework using multiple data mining techniques, in order to extract valuable
intelligence from people’s complaints. The intelligence generated by our system can be used by
security professionals and law enforcement to detect, mitigate and prevent telephony abuses.
2.4.1 Classification
Classification is a data mining technique aimed to divide data into different classes. The classification
algorithms rely on a labeled training dataset to build the classification model, which will predict the
classes of new data based on the training dataset. In this thesis, we use text classification, which is
the classification of text documents [26].
2.4.2 Regression
Regression is a supervised machine learning technique that divides the dataset into different classes.
The regression model is built based on a training dataset relying on two variables: the explanatory
variable x, which is the feature vector, and the dependent variable y, which represents the class of
items in the dataset [26].
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2.4.3 Frequent Pattern Mining
Frequent Pattern Mining is a technique that studies and detects the pattern of items in a dataset. This
technique provides two applications, (i) Frequent itemset, and (ii) Rule association mining. Frequent
itemset provides the appearance frequency of items in a dataset in a given time span. Rule association
mining presents items co-occurring together in the dataset. In order to control the results of these
techniques, different parameters such as minimum support, which defines how much the appearance
threshold of an item to be taken into consideration, and association rule confidence, which sets a
threshold of items co-occurrence [26], are used.
2.4.4 Text mining
Text mining is a data analysis field that focuses on extracting knowledge, valuable information,
patterns, etc. from the analysis of text documents. It also involves the use of different data mining
and machine learning techniques such as classification, clustering, and different other algorithms
such as topic modeling, sentimental analysis, document summarization, etc. to achieve the analysis
purpose [26]. Text mining process goes through multiple steps before the final results. First, the
text is parsed and structured. Then, text preprocessing is completed using different techniques such
as tokenization, stemming, and removal of stop words. Afterward, features engineering is applied
to the preprocessed documents, which in turn involves different techniques related to text such as,
Term Frequency or Term Frequency minus Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) to create the word
feature vector. Finally, machine learning, data mining or other data analysis techniques are applied to
the data for classification, clustering or other purposes.
2.5 Assessment of Telephony Abuse
The drastic increase of telephony abuse has led to different studies to understand its nature and its
impacts in order to develop appropriate mitigation techniques. However, due to the complexity
of the telephony infrastructure, which is composed of telephony landline, mobile telephony, and
telephony over Internet Protocol, the security community is far from controlling and defending
against this threat. Abusers have been using different techniques and tricks to scam telephony
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customers. Examples of these types of scams are the IRS scam, credit card scams, and many others,
which are launched sometimes into campaigns. Therefore, the analysis of different telephony scams
and the explanation of how they work is a primordial step in detecting and mitigating them.
In this section, we present the major works done on the assessment of telephony fraud and compare
it with work done on email fraud. Then, we present the techniques and proposed work to defend
against telephony threats. Furthermore, we explore other cyber security areas, where telephony was
used as a mean for scams or fraud. Lastly, we describe the work completed on the analysis of the
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Figure 2.1: Classification of Telephony Abuse Analysis Studies
2.5.1 Comparaison Study between Email and Phone Fraud
Many research papers have discussed the security issues related to email spam and phishing attacks,
such as in [34] and [46]. In [34], Khade and Shinde used data mining to detect phishing websites.
On the other hand, Pandey and Ravi [46] used text mining to detect email spam. The authors of these
works explained the difficulty of preventing phishing attacks since criminals use social engineering
techniques, which are by nature difficult to detect and combat. In addition to the fact that Internet
users lack awareness on the techniques these criminals use. These kinds of attacks went from using
the Internet to explore other channels, such as telephony lines. Figure 2.2 illustrates the percentage of
abuser’s method of contacting their victims between 2012 and 2016 according to the Federal Trade






































Figure 2.2: Statistics on Channel used to fraud victims– Phone vs Email [49]
service as mean of approaching their targets instead of the traditional email. Moreover, very few
studies have discussed these new telephony threats. Therfore, in this thesis, a key objectives is to
understand these threats as well as to provide further intelligence on these kinds of abuse. In order
to attain these objectives, a framework was built and real-life data was used. Griffing and Rackley
[23] explored the new alternative medium for Internet phishing, namely voice phishing (vishing).
The authors showed how, with little knowledge and cost, a vishing attack could be conducted. The
work also explains that the financial risk-to-reward ratio of vishing attack was high. The authors
explained the techniques that could be added to the attack scheme to make it highly successful, and
discussed how attackers spoof large banks or internet providers, as examples. Furthermore, in [15],
Chanvarasuth conducted an experiment where he compared the effects of phishing and vishing on
Thai students. The results showed that students are vulnerable to both phishing and vishing attacks.
Also, many other researchers have studied the security issues related to telephony scams, such as
in [21] and [59]. In [58], Tu et al. proposed an authentication scheme to control Caller ID and stop
unwanted spoofed calls. The objective of the proposed scheme is to offer the possibility of securing
the calling line identification Q.731.3, and help to guide in the future development of a standardized
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scheme in authenticating SS7 identities. In 2014, Mustafa et al. [40] created an android mobile
application CallerDec that detects calls that uses a spoofed caller ID in combination with Public
Switched Telephony Network (PSTN landline) and cellular network information.
2.5.2 Studies Relying on Honeypots
One of the most used techniques to collect data on cyber security events is Honeypot systems. Gupta
et al. [24] enumerated the drawbacks of the crowd data sources as follows. First, even though the
victims reported numerous complaints on these websites, nothing can confirm their completeness
since it is hard, if not impossible, to assume that all the victims reported their complaints on these
websites, owing to the facts that some victims do not have Internet access and other users do not
know the existence of such websites. Second, making a complaint in these websites is not something
difficult to do, which affects the accuracy of the data. People can make complaints that are not
related to telephony onslaught; besides, it is difficult to demonstrate who are the people making these
complaints since it could be the attackers themselves, trying to confuse the data. Lastly, victims
usually report the abuses after being harassed by numerous calls, which causes a delay between the
time when the call was made and when it was reported; hence, one cannot confirm the timeliness
of the user’s supplied data. Subsequently, the authors implemented a telephony honeypot to collect
data about telephony abuses. The authors discussed the benefits and the limitation of such honeypot.
According to the authors, the honeypot collected much more data about abusers than what has been
found in the reported complaints to FTC. The honeypot collected and reported the abuses of telephone
lines. This telephony honeypot collected call data from unassigned phone numbers. By doing so, the
telephony honeypot generated complete, timely and accurate telephony abuse data in comparison
with crowd sourced datasets. Nevertheless, in this study, the researchers used manual analysis by
performing some off-line statistics on the collected data.
Bladuzzi et al. [11, 12] studied telephony fraud by focusing on mobile telephony threats in Asia,
specifically China. They presented a mobile telephony honeypot namely Mobipot. Similar to the
work done by Gupta et al. [24], this honeypot was introduced to collect suspicious calls and SMS
messages targeting mobile users. Mobipot collected more than two thousand calls and SMS messages
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after more than seven months of deployment. The authors analyzed the collected results and showed
how more than fifty per cent of the calls were suspicious. Afterward, they identified patterns of the
behavior of criminals attacking mobile users.
Marzuoli et al. [38] presented threat intelligence that was extracted from the analysis of telephony
scam data. Their dataset was collected from a telephony honeypot that received more than one
million calls. The results of this analysis showed that half of the robocalls were only generated from 8
distinct abusers. Gupta et al. [25] built a system that collects and correlates information on telephony
customers from multiple applications, such as, social media and email, in order to craft phishing
attacks. The system then determines which over-the-top content (OTT) messaging application they
can reach the victims through, to execute their vishing scheme. This showed the effectiveness of
such a system and the simplicity of launching such attacks by relying on phone numbers.
2.5.3 Studies Relying on Users Complaints
Crowdsourced datasets are playing a big part in combating telephony threats. Researchers used these
large databases to investigate different telephony related attacks. For instance, 800notes.com [43],
Callercomplaints.com [55], FTC complaints [10], whocallsme.com [35], and some others are used
to investigate suspicious sources. The different datasets contain complaints about telephony abuses
where the victims indicate the telephone numbers of the sources and report information about these
numbers. In 2010, Maggi [36] designed and implemented a framework to collect complaints about
voice phishing attacks. Contrary to honeypot collected datasets, this study vetted the customer’s
complaints by accepting it after investigating the complainer, which gave it more accuracy. Besides,
the researchers asked the victims to provide the information they wanted to generate; such as,
the caller ID, the spoken language, the country of the source, and to transcribe the conversation.
This study permitted the collection and provided statistics about telephony phishers. Through this
implementation, they succeeded in collecting only a small dataset of 300 complaints compared to
the crowdsourced datasets. Therefore, more advanced analysis on a larger dataset would be of keen
interest and would yield beneficial intelligence. Finally, Maggi et al. [37] implemented a system that
contains two small modules to collect phishing information. The first module captures telephone
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conversations about voice phishing, and the second module captures phishing emails. Then the
authors compared both techniques to understand their potential applications. Their work showed
the efficiency of voice phishing over traditional email phishing techniques. Nevertheless, the main
drawback in all of these studies remains the small size of the dataset.
2.5.4 Surveys on Telephony Fraud
Sahin et al. [50] carried out a comprehensive study and provided a taxonomy of fraud in the telephony
network. The taxonomy divides the features of telephony fraud into, the causes, the weaknesses,
the techniques, the fraud scheme and the fraud benefits. In their work, Tu et al. [57] tackled the
issue of Spam in telephony network (SPIT). The authors surveyed the existing techniques to combat
telephony Spam and compared it to email Spam. Their work showed that there is no effective solution
to prevent SPIT yet. However, some methods or combination of some techniques showed a good
level of effectiveness. Other studies have applied systems that present countermeasures to telephony
threats, such as in [53], where the author proposed a framework to detect spoofed calls. Recently,
J. Chaudhry and S. A. Chaudhry, [16] enumerated the different techniques to prevent Caller ID
spoofing, and provided a comparison between these methods. Then, they presented some areas to
control Caller ID spoofing, and proposed a solution that rely on strengthening the identification
security in telecommunication networks.
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Chapter 3
Chasing Telephony Abuse: Analysis of
Users’ Complaints to Profile Threats
and Identify Campaigns
3.1 Introduction
The emergence of technology and the Internet have changed everything in our daily life, from
business services and learning to social interactions. Nonetheless, although the digital world made
our life much easier since we can engage in all our activities using different technologies, we are
exposed to a new lifestyle, with little knowledge concerning its risks and dangers. Precisely, the
appearance of commercial online transactions led to new types of crimes called ”Cybercrimes.”
Among these, we can name phishing, pharming, spamming activities, etc. For instance, phishing
is a criminal act where the phisher pretends being a legitimate person from an enterprise, bank,
or government agencies in order to scam people into giving their private personal information or
sensitive data. A credit card number, social insurance number, and other personal information are
used by these criminals illegally afterward. Fraudsters applied some of the cyber-attacks by sending
their victims spoofed emails that link them to fraudulent websites. The later can look like the
legitimate website of a bank or a company, but by doing so, they trick people into divulging their
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financial or personal information.
Cyber criminals exploited the Internet to communicate and social engineer their victims by
sending them emails or interacting with them through social networks. However, a few years ago,
cyber-criminals started using another channel to reach their victims, namely telephony.
This is mainly due to the fact that Internet telephony technologies and services have lowered the
costs of voice services and provided a platform for innovative services and applications. Internet
telephony has also enabled abuses such as new forms of automated bulk call generation that can
disrupt telephony services. In addition, it has enabled more effective and efficient forms of unsolicited
telemarketing that integrate interactive voice response systems and dialing algorithms. Moreover,
cyber criminals use phishing techniques by calling or sending SMS to telephony users as a mean to
steal their credentials. These challenges are further complicated by the inability of telephone users –
virtually everyone – to verify the calling party information, which provides a degree of anonymity
for abusers. Furthermore, the new availability of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) helped in the
increase of swindler’s activities due to the protocol’s many features; such as the anonymity of the
offender and the difficulty of tracing the number back. Moreover, the telephony abuses are increasing
over time due also to the relatively low rates of the telephony communications. Many studies were
done previously to assess different types of cyber-attacks, but only a few studies were done on
telephony abuses. As a result, a better understanding of these types of abuses is required for detection,
mitigation and attribution purposes.
To this end, the primary objective of this thesis is to develop new techniques, together with
algorithms and tools, to contribute to the analysis of this new emergent cyber threat. This Thesis
lies in the domain of telephony abuse analysis and campaign detection using newly developed and
designed systems, along with a set of existing data mining techniques. The telephony abuse analysis
framework can be an effective solution to analyzes, investigates, and potentially mitigates the abuses
over voice channels. However, the complaints data filled to government agencies and to telephone
service providers can be overwhelming and noisy especially if it is aggregated from different sources.
The information collected with this framework will be aggregated and analyzed to identify trends
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and provide insights into unsolicited calling patterns to understand the origins of spoofed calls and
other telephony abuses. Furthermore, in this thesis, we explain how our automatic framework take as
an input the complaint’s data coming from different sources, and output clusters of phone numbers
having some different extracted features, to help in the early detection of telephony abuses, and
identify malicious calling campaigns. We suppose the importance of such framework since to the
best of our knowledge no research work did such an automatic and real-time analysis on telephony
threats. We believe that such work can assist investigator and legal entities to deal with these new
type of onslaughts. Besides, it will help the security community to combat more effectively such
emergent threats.
3.2 Dataset
We secured complaint data in near-real-time from our partners; an average of 2,000 complaints
is received per day. This number increased to more than 8,000 in 2016. Thus far, we gathered
more than 5 million complaints during a 7-year period. Our dataset contains more than five million
complaints. The script logs that received complaints contain multiple attributes such as the source
phone number, the victim phone number, the time when the complaint was made, the call type, the
caller identification, and the message expressing the underlying complaint. Table 3.1 presents the
attributes of the complaints together with their description.
3.3 Framework Architecture
The goals of Telephony Abuse Intelligence Framework (TAINT) through its components are to
automatically: (i) aggregate and analyze telephony abuse complaints filled up by telephony customers,
(ii) identify and geo-locate scamming perpetrators and their utilized infrastructure, (iii) rank reported
phone numbers in the complaints data according to their badness score, and (iv) cluster telephony
abuses to unveil potential groups that are behind particular scamming campaigns. As input, it takes
real-time telephony complaints that are then subjected to extensive analysis. The latter produce
timely and relevant intelligence about worldwide telephony abuse activities. Such intelligence is
meant to empower law enforcement investigators, and/or Telephony Service Providers (TSPs) in their
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Data Field Description
Source Number A string containing the
Calling Party Number
Victim Number A string containing the
Callee Party Number
Call Type A string containing the
Call Type assigned by the
victiim
Caller Identification A string representing the
calling-line identification
information if present
Time A date/time object indicat-
ing the date-time of when
the complaint was made
Complaint Text A message expressing the
underlying complaint
Table 3.1: Description of the Collected Information
efforts for the detection, mitigation and attribution of telephony abuse activities that are perpetrated
by telemarketers, debit collectors, scammers, etc. In this section, we present the architecture of our
framework and its main components. Figure 3.1 provides a high-level overview of the framework
and the interaction between its essential components. TAINT different components are enumerated
hereafter:
(1) Telephony complaints text features extraction and classification
(2) Correlation
(3) Online features extractor
(4) Badness scoring of the scammers infrastructure
(5) Campaign detection
3.3.1 Telephony Complaints Text Features Extraction and Classification
The first component of TAINT aims to classify the complaints into two classes: telephony abuse















Figure 3.1: TAINT Framework Overview
in this work revealed that it contains a number non-related telephone abuse complaints. Since, the
collection of the complaints is through a web page, people make mistakes as to which form they
should fill in their complaints. For instance, people complaining about an Internet service provider as
illustrated in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Screenshot of a None Telephony Abuse Complaint
In addition, we assume that law enforcement agencies and telephone service providers receive
numerous complaints about different problems their clients might face. Therefore, the classification
of complaints is a required step in our framework to filter the complaints so that TAINT analyzes only
the telephony abuse complaints. To do so, the module goes through 3 phases: the collection phase,
the learning phase and the execution phase. In the collection phase, we collect general conversation
data from 20newsgroups[42] text dataset. This dataset contains more than 18000 conversations
about 20 different general topics. We use such dataset to build baseline knowledge about general
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conversation in order to differentiate them from telephone complaints. In the learning phase, we split
the 20newsgroups and the complaints dataset into: (i) 70% training dataset and (ii) 30% test dataset
to build a classification model that distinguishes telephony complaints from non-related complaints
or text data. Then, we feed this data to a classification algorithm to build a model that will be used
later on to classify the streamed complaints. In the execution phase, we pre-process the complaints
from text messages to extract the features, and create a class where we label the complaints as Valid
or Non-Valid. This phase is executed in 4 steps:
(1) We tokenize (separate the words in a document) the complaint document.
(2) We apply stemming (reduce the words to their stem) on the tokenized words, to get the root of
the words to reduce our features set size and thus better accuracy of the classifier.
(3) We remove the stop words and the special characters from the documents.
(4) We apply TF-IDF on our preprocessed documents in order to obtain the most frequent and
important words in each document in relation with the whole dataset.
Afterwards, the features extracted through the text pre-processing of the complaints are then used
as an input to the Support Vector Machine Classifier (SVM), and later in the other components of
TAINT.
Support Vector Machine Classifier The Support vector machine (SVM) is a supervised machine
learning technique that is widely used for binary classification and regression. The rationale un-
derlying the use of SVMs is that they are known to outperform other classifiers when it comes to
supervised text categorization [30]. Furthermore, text classification relies on word vector features,
which results in a multidimensional data analysis. Joachims [30] shows that SVM do not require
feature selection to build an accurate classification model comparing to the other suggested classifiers.
Having a training dataset, and aiming to classify our complaints data into two main classes, we found
that SVM is the most suitable machine learning technique for our problem. We also used TF-IDF to
improve the performance of text classification as suggested in [51].
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3.3.2 Correlation
In order to enrich the complaint dataset, we extract the phone number reported in the complaint and
we correlate them with other telephony databases. Our goal is to derive other information in our
analyses, such as the geographic distribution of telephony abuse incidents. We mainly use the data
sources provided by the Canadian Numbering Administrator (CNA) [19] and the North American
Numbering Plan Administration (NANPA) [41] to determine the location of North American phone
calls. In addition, we rely on the recommendation of the International Telecommunication Union -
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), namely E.164, to determine the country of origin
for international calls. The correlation of the dataset results in three main classes of phone numbers
according to the origin location: North America, non-geographic or toll-free, and international.
Using the correlation tool, we extract two additional features that will be used in the subsequent
components. The two additional features are:
• Invalid phone numbers: Invalid phone numbers are the numbers that do not conform to the
North American Numbering Plan and cannot be dialed within the public switched telephone
network. This may be viewed as the traditional form of spoofing, where the calling party
number is relatively static and fictitious (e.g, 0123-4567-8910). Valid numbers conform to
NANPA or international assignments under Recommendation ITU-T E.164. The numbers
extracted may be formatted as an international numbers or as national numbers.
• Unassigned or VoIP phone number: These numbers use a valid phone number format, but
the numbering plan area is unassigned within NANPA (e.g, 123-456-7890), which is a valid
number that is not assigned to any customer.
3.3.3 Online Feature Extractor
The complaints are streamed to the feature extractor, which is a near-real-time component in TAINT
framework with the main role of online features computation. There are many features that need to
be computed from the complaints stream to provide various analytics. Some of the features do not
inherently support online computation such as frequent pattern mining features [8, 27]. Accordingly,
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we implement other frequent item set algorithms [17], which rely on graph representation in memory.
The main difference between our implementation and the one proposed in [17] is the use of a persistent
graph database instead of a graph-based representation. Further details on the implementation of the
frequent item set will be presented in the implementation Section.
The output of the features extractor is two streams of features: one stream for phone numbers and
the other stream is for caller identification. These streams of features are used to feed a clustering
system. The aim of using a clustering system is to automatically group the complaints data into
clusters that give a clear grouping in each cluster rather than grouping all the items, which can be
overwhelming. On the other hand, the generated clusters represent calling type categories such as
invalid phone numbers, and spoofed phone numbers.
Extracting Features for Clustering
In order to be able to group relevant suspicious phone numbers and the caller identification, we need
to identify clustering features. The latter are used to cluster the phone numbers according to defined
criteria. The features need to be extracted on the fly from the complaints stream. The complaints
input stream is generated after receiving a complaint from a victim. We perform an offline analysis
on a seven years dataset from the complaints feed. We study the static and the dynamic behaviors
of the calling phone numbers to determine the features that are more likely related to the level of
suspiciousness. Evidently, the earlier the system detects a relevant threat the sooner the threat can be
mitigated.
The result of analyzing a relatively large dataset of the telephony complaints is the extraction of 17
different features that we use to provide various analytics and estimate the damage caused by the
reported phone numbers and caller identification.
There are 8 statistical features shared between the phone numbers and caller identifications. We
define 17 features for phone numbers and 12 features for caller identifications, as we will present in
the next section.
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Number of distinct values
Number of distinct regions
Average calls of the targets
STD calls of the targets
STD = Standard Deviation.
Table 3.2: Common Features
Features Selection
To determine the relevant features for our analysis of the telephony complaints, we analyzed the
complaints dataset and the involved phone numbers and Caller Identifications. Then, we extracted 17
features that can be used to generate intelligence from the phone numbers and caller Identifications
that are relevant for investigations. There are 13 features (Table 3.3) to group the phone numbers, and
12 features (Table 3.4) for caller IDs. Among these features, 8 features (Table 3.2) are shared among
phone numbers and caller IDs. Clearly, the grouping can drastically decease the overwhelming and
nosiness of the collected complaints. In the following, we present the statistical features used in
TAINT. We first present the common features between the phone numbers and the caller IDs, as
shown in Table 3.2. Afterwards, we present the phone number features and caller IDs features, as
depicted in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively.
Common Ranking Features
In what follows, we present the common statistical features between the caller IDs and phone
numbers which can be categorized into: Temporal features, and targeted victims.
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Source and target list similarity
Source and target set similarity
STD = Standard Deviation.
Table 3.3: Phone Numbers Features
Feature Set # Feature Name





Number of distinct values
Number of distinct regions
Distinct values average calls
Distinct values STD
STD = Standard Deviation.
Table 3.4: Caller Identifications Features
Temporal Features
In this category of features, we analyze the time, in which the complaints have been made. The
complaint time does not provide enough information to detect the pattern of a calling campaign.
For instance, a TDOS campaign will call a phone number multiple time in a short period; whereas
a telemarketing campaign may call a phone number the same number of times but within a larger
period. The distribution of complaints about time, in which the system received more complaints
reporting a particular phone number or caller identification. In particular, we analyze the distribution
of the complaints that are reporting a specific phone number or caller identification in four different
time spans as described in the following:
• The Daily Occurrence: The percentage of the days in which the system received complaints
reporting a phone number or caller identification. From our manual analyses, we found that
there are phone numbers reported same number of time. However, the distribution is very
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different; some number were reported only over one day and others have sparse distribution.
Using this feature, we can distinguish between the temporal behavior of each phone number.
• The Week Days Occurrence: The percentage of the days of the week in which the telephony
system received complaints reporting a specific phone number or caller identification. In
this feature, we focus on the weekly distribution of the complaints reporting a phone number.
Similar to what [24] reported, the telephony abuse intelligence framework receives complaints
on all weekdays. However, only a small amount of complaitns is received during the weekend.
Using this feature, we differentiate between phone numbers that are abusing victims during
the weekend and those that are not, which could distinguish the purpose of the call.
• The Hourly Occurrence : The percentage of the hours from all the complaints life span hours
in which the telephony complaints websites received a complaint from the phone number or
the caller identification. This feature shares the same goal with the daily occurrence feature
but with more granularity. This helps in generating quick alarms about specific detected abuse
or campaign.
• The Day Hours Occurrence: The percentage of the hours of the day when the system received
complaints reporting a phone number or caller identification. The hourly occurrence during
the day spots the light on the distribution of the calls over the day. This feature could be
very insightful concerning the time zone of the phone numbers. We notice during our manual
analysis that the peak calling time for phone numbers could be different.
There are various data mining algorithms for extracting frequent patterns, such as Apriori [8], FP-
growth [27], and ECLAT [61]. However, these algorithms compute the frequent item set on the whole
dataset, which is very expensive. We leverage the frequent item set algorithms to extract temporal
features; however, we implement a lighter version of a frequent item set in order to build an online
frequent item set extraction. This will be further discussed in the implementation section.
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Targeted Phone Number Features
The complaints records generated from the complaints dataset consist of the source and the target of
the abuse. The source is the phone number that was reported by the complainer. In this category of
features, we focus on the targeted victims. Clearly, these features could give an insight about how
suspicious the phone number or the caller identification. It is evident that calling many people is
more suspicious than calling one targeted phone number. Moreover, this could give a more clear idea
about the nature of the abuse. In the following, we define the features related to the targeted victims:
• Number of Distinct Values: We believe that the number of customers phone numbers that are
targeted is an important feature for two main reasons. First, it could help detect the abused very
early when the source phone number or caller ID is calling multiple phone numbers. Second, it
could spot the light on the nature of the abuse. For instance, we found in our manual analysis a
call pattern, which is manifested by calling one targeted phone number intensively for a period
of time; This could be a TDOS (Telephony Denial Of Service) attack. Another example is
addressed in [24], where the authors give an example how we could use the number of targeted
phone numbers to distinguish between the telemarketers and debt collectors.
• Number of Distinct Regions : To enhance the previous feature, we define the distinct regions
of the targeted phone number that have been called. Relying on this feature, we could gain
information about the geographic region being targeted that comes from specific phone numbers
or a caller identification. We found some reported phone numbers calling multiple targets
in the same region, while others call multiple targets phone number in different geographic
regions.
• Average Calls of The Targets: To compute this feature, we divide the total number of calls
on the The number of distinct targets phones which give the average calls to each victim
phone numbers. We consider this feature and the next feature the standard deviation as
complementary features. The aim is to gains insight on the number of different victims
targeted by the given number.
• The Standard Deviation of the Targets Calls: By computing the standard deviation, we could
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define if the phone number or the caller identification is calling the targets phone number
uniformly or randomly. The value of this feature indicates how much the call varies from the
average calls – the previous feature – that have been made to the target phone numbers.
Phone Numbers Features:
In addition to the common features, there are some specific features to the source phone numbers.
We define two main categories: the caller identification features and the phone string features, as we
are going to present in the following:
Caller Identification Features
The caller identification, which the source phone number is using, is more likely a key of defining
the characteristics of a specific phone number. The following features focus on caller ID as a part of
the phone number ranking features:
• Number of distinct values : How many Caller IDs the phone number used, is an important
metric to understand the abuse of the phone number. We found, from our manual analysis,
that there are phone numbers with different caller identification. This shows that these phone
numbers were use in different calling campaigns, thus these numbers are more suspicious
and should be investigated. On the other hand, other phone numbers use the same caller
identifications, such as a bank name, and are involved temporary in one particular calling
campaign.
• Number of distinct regions : The geographic spreading of phone numbers is an important
feature to evaluate the abuse of a given caller identification. The wider is the geographic spread
indicates a bigger campaign.
• Average calls : In this feature, we compute the average calls that has been made by each caller
identifications. To compute this feature, we divide the number of total calls of a phone number
on the number of its caller identifications. This feature helps to easily identify whether a phone
number is involved in one campaign or many.
31
• Calls STD : Using the standard deviation of calls on the caller identification, we could estimate
whether the abuser is generating the caller identification randomly or not.
Phone String Features
This category of features is for only source phone numbers. We use the string of both reported source
and victim phone numbers to compute the similarity. We define two type of similarity for phone
numbers as presented in the following:
• List similarity: We compute this similarity by matching the source and victim phone numbers
using the Jaccard similarity index as will presented in the implementation section, which
produces a value between zero and one. The bigger is the value, the more the target and the
source are similar. The value one means that the source and the target are identical.
• Set similarity: To compute this feature, we extract the unique digits from source and compare
them with the unique digits of the target phone number. The similarity is the number of
intersection digits divided by the number of union digits.
3.3.4 Badness Scoring of the Scammers Infrastructure
In order to provide law enforcement investigators and Telephony Service Provider (TSP) operators
with an appreciation of the severity level of telephony abuse incidents, we elaborate a badness scoring
to the phone number reported in each complaint. To do so, we rely on a training dataset that was
provided to us by law enforcement officers. This dataset contain the complaint text and the source
phone number along with their badness score. The badness score is a value between 1 and 100,
where 1 refers to a low severity of the phone number, and 100 refers to the highest severity. In order
to assign its badness score, law enforcement officers relied on the losses each phone number has
caused to. As a result, this badness score will help to identify the most worthy phone numbers for
investigation. We used this labeled dataset to create a regression model to assign a badness score to
the new reported phone numbers. To this end, we subject our dataset to a linear regression machine
learning algorithm. To train the linear regression machine learning model, we use the phone number
reported in the complaint along with the word vector feature generated from the Telephony complaints
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text features extraction and classification component of TAINT as the explanatory variable X . Then,
we use the badness score of phone numbers information provided by our partner as the dependent
variable y. Similar to the procedure mentioned in the Telephony complaints text features extraction
and classification component, we first train and build the regression model. Secondly, we evaluate
the model on the test dataset. Lastly, we run the model on the streamed data to automatically rank
the new arriving complaints.
3.3.5 Campaign Detection
Telephony Abuse Campaign:
Telephony abuse campaign is a cyber attack in which one or multiple parties with a common objective
(e.g., steal credit card numbers and sell them in the black market) coordinate and plan to attack or
scam a group of people vulnerable to one of their attack schema. In our dataset, we have a multitude
of complaints about various campaigns that victims have been subjected to. To detect telephony
abusing campaigns, we apply record linkage on our dataset. For this, we consider the CNAM
feature, and the word vector feature generated from Telephony complaints text features extraction
and classification component of TAINT to link the similar source numbers. We choose these features
since abusers usually rely on the CNAM as the first attribute of their attack; for instance, fraudesters
will use a Bank Name to scam a bank customers. Furthermore, we choose the complaint text to
potentially get similar complaints, thus similar abusers.
Subsequently, we create a graph that represents the relation between these different source numbers.
This graph helps in the visualization of the different campaigns, and it will be used as an input to
the campaign detection algorithm. The nodes of this graph represent the phone numbers of the call
sources, and the edges show that these sources use a similar CNAM, and have a similar technique in
approaching their victims which indicates that it is a similar type of abuse. The result of this exercise
gives us a network of phone numbers used in similar scamming campaigns, which in turn helps to
identifying potential sources of fraud.
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Record Linkage
As described above, we proceed with the detection of potential telephony scamming campaigns. We
began our analysis by obtaining all reported phone numbers along with their caller identifications and
word vectors. We then create a list of all caller IDs used by each number and the aggregated word
vector. This provides information about the types of abuse in which these numbers are employed. In
the analysis of our dataset of complaints, we build a connection network of security events that are
attributed to the same type of telephony abuse. Security events are visualized, in our representation,
as a graph that refers to a multitude of telephony campaigns, such as vishing, telemarketing, political
campaign, etc. Our ultimate goal is to obtain better insight about the instigators of telephony abuse
activities. The graph reported in Figure 4.7 provides a graphical representation of the detected calling
campaigns. The graph shows phone numbers that have been used to make independent calls that are
not connected to other numbers. However, the graph depicts other numbers that are related to other
source numbers as they are using a set of similar caller identification information, and have been
reported abusing victims in the the same way. As such, these numbers are considered to be part of
the same calling campaign.
Similarity Computation
Building the similarity network is an important module of TAINT framework. We generate the
similarity network by computing the similarity between feature vectors. Moreover, having multiple
similarities between the involved phone numbers in the similarity network shows a close relationship
between these phone numbers, which indicates potential similar actors. To compute the similarity
matrix for the sources in the complaints dataset, we use the caller identification as well as the
extracted features from the complaint text messages. The idea is that phone numbers that use similar
spoofed caller identifications and have the same pattern in approaching the victims are most likely
part of the same campaign. The similarity between the different numbers is calculated using the
Jaccard Similarity Index. We choose Jaccard Similarity Index since it is known to be efficient when
it comes to document similarities, and it has shown a promising results for our problem compared
to other techniques such as Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH). When using LSH, we noticed that
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many similar documents were omitted. Given a pair of phone numbers, after extracting the feature
vectors, we use the Jaccard distance to compute the distance between two feature vectors m and
n. The Jaccard Similarity Index is computed by first calculating the intersection of two sets A and
B, which are the number of the elements that exist in both A and B. Then, computing the union of
different elements in both set A and set B. Finally, the cardinality of the intersection of the two sets




The final result of the similarity computation produced a heterogeneous graph, since some nodes did
not have any edges whereas other nodes had multiple edges. The nodes of the network represent the
phone numbers and the edges represent the similarity between these phone numbers if it exceeds a
certain threshold. The threshold value is fixed after a manual testing and evaluation.
Adjacency Matrix Computation The spamming campaign network is represented via an adja-
cency matrix, where each value is a binary value, either 0 or 1. The Matrix is used as an input to the
community detection algorithm in order to unveil the different campaigns. If two phone numbers are
estimated similar based on their caller identification list and word vector feature, and are above a
chosen threshold, the value one is assigned to this pair of sources. On the other hand, if the similarity
between the caller identification list and word vector features of two different phone numbers is below
the chosen threshold, then the value of 0 is given to that pair. Using the computed adjacency matrix,
we build a graph that illustrates the relational network underlying our data. The graph contains many
clusters of communities. These communities most likely represent different calling campaigns. We
apply the campaign detection algorithm on our complaint data represented in the similarity matrix.
Community Detection
To extract the different calling campaigns, we use the Fast Unfolding Community Detection Al-
gorithm [13]. We choose this algorithm [13]; since, it can scale to hundreds of millions of nodes
and billions of links. Furthermore, through it’s technique the algorithm achieves good results since
it relies on measuring the modularity of communities, to unveil the different communities. The
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modularity is a scale value between -1 and 1 that measures the density of links inside communities as
compared to links between communities. Similar to work completed in [33], we feed our computed
network to the algorithm. Then, we use a degree filtering parameter to filter all the nodes that have
less degree than the chosen parameter. We chose the threshold of the Jacquard similarity index to
the value of 0.3, since using these parameters we had more false positive. As we know that the
investigator can easily look afterwards into a given campaign and filter those very easily. Nodes
with a high connections will keep up their edges, which indicates that they are malicious telephone
numbers that belongs to that particular campaign. We have fixed all the parameters in our assessments
as follow. First, we use the degree 1 to filter all telephone numbers having no connection to what
other telephone numbers; since they are clearly not part of any campaign. Our system filters these
phone numbers as they are supposedly isolated caller. Then, we extract the different communities .
This method permits an effective grouping of campaign. Lastly, we compute the average badness
score generated from the Badness Scoring of the Scammers Infrastructure component of the phone
numbers and caller identification involved in each campaign to get its badness score.
Campaign Identification
Giving a set of campaigns: C = {C1, C2, C3, ..., CN}, and a call event as: Ei = 〈si, di, ti,mi, idi〉,
where :
• si is the source node in Ei ,
• di is the destination node in Ei ,
• ti is the time when Ei happened ,
• mi is the message in Ei and,
• idi is the Caller Identification in Ei.
We claim that Ei belongs to the campaign Ci if and only if:
• ti - ls < τ ( where ls is the last time when Ci was detected, and τ is a chosen threshold)
• Given Ei,j∈N , mi ≈ mj
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• Having idi,j , where idi ≈ idj
Note that Jaccard similarity index is used for the above similarity computation.
Real-time Campaign Identification
To detect campaigns in real-time, we follow the rules described below:
Given a call eventEi = 〈si, di, ti,mi, idi〉, and a known set of campaignsC1 = {E1, E2, E3, ..., EN1},
C2 = {E1, E2, E3, ..., EN2}, until Cn = {E1, E2, E3, ..., ENm}. We then Evaluate for each given
(E,C) whether:
(1) We create a new campaign, or
(2) We consider that Ei ∈ Ci
The following algorithm 1 details the process:








if ti - Last seen < τ then
if ( idi ≈ idj and mi ≈ mj) then












In this section, we detail the back-end data process, and the front-end analytics.
3.4.1 Back-end
In this section, we detail the implementation of TAINT back-end. We present the general components
of TAINT and the role of each component.
Telephony Abuse Intelligence Framework has different components that take part in analyzing the
complaints from various sources. We choose each component of TAINT to suit well the objective of
our solution. We enumerate the components of TAINT in the following:
• Apache Kafka: We first pre-proccess and store the complaints in near real-time using a python
script. This results into a feed that is streamed to our system using Apache Kafka [31], which
is an Apache open-source software used as a high-throughput distributed messaging system. It
provides a unified and low-latency platform for real-time handling of datasets. We use Kafka as
a temporary feed storage, where other components of the system can asynchronously retrieve
the complaints. Since our system do real-time analysis and is designed to handle big data, we
choose Kafka to allow easy distribution of the processes
• MongoDB: These complaints are persisted into Mongodb [2], an open-source and highly
scalable document database, which is used to store the complaints in a document format. Since
our framework aggregates and analyzes data from different sources, we choose Mongodb
which stores the information as JSON document which can vary in structure. This allows also
the easy integration of other information from other collection sources, such as, a telephony
honeypot, to our Framework.
• Neo4j: The online features extractor component leverages the graph format provided by
Neo4j and the asynchronous stream provided by Kafka to generate the features. Moreover,
the feature extraction relies, for some features, on external data sources such as Canadian
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Numbering Administrator [19] and North American Numbering Plan Administration [41] for
North American phone numbers, or International Assignments under Recommendation ITU-T
E.164 for international phone numbers. We choose Neo4j as it allows easy manipulation and
querying of graph data. We use it as well to extract the communities and hence detect the
different calling campaigns.
• Redis: After computing the features, we store them in in-memory key-value database for
high-speed operations. The key is the phone number and the value is its features. We chose


























Figure 3.3: Components of TAINT Framework
Online Feature Computation
In this component, we mainly leverage the graph representation of the complaints records in the graph
database – Neo4j. We choose to present the feature computation for Temporal Features and Phone
String Features. For the rest of the features, the same techniques are used in their computation.
Temporal Features In order to extract the temporal features, we use frequent item set (part of
Frequent Pattern Mining [26]). Discovery of frequent patterns is an important problem in the
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area of data mining. This problem is introduced in [8] and can be formalized as follows. Let
I = {i1, i2, . . . , im} be a set of literals, called items. Let D be the transaction database where each
transaction T is a non-empty itemset such that t ⊆ I. Each transaction in the database is identified
by TID. A set of items is called an itemset, and an itemset with k items is called a k-itemset. In our
implementation, we compute the support of 1-itemset, where the itemset is the phone number or the
caller identification. The support of an itemset x in D, denoted as σ(x/D), is the ratio of the number















Figure 3.4: Phone Numbers Graph Structure Example
Instead of using the current implementation of frequent item set such as Apriori [8], FP-growth [27],
and ECLAT [61], we exploit the graph structure of complaints in the database, as depicted in Fig. 3.4
for phone numbers and Fig. 3.5 for caller identifications.
In case of temporal features, for instance the daily occurrence, the itemset support is used for
computing the daily occurrence by counting the edges with distinct dates. Thus, the phone number
support (the daily occurrence) is the number of distinct dates divided by the total day in the life span
of the collected dataset. In the example depicted in Fig. 3.5, we show how to compute the support
from the graph structure. We use the same calculation method to compute the temporal feature for
the phone number. Furthermore, it is also used in caller identification temporal feature extraction.
















Figure 3.5: Caller Identification Graph Structure Example
Finally, the clustering system leverages the high speed of the feature-cache to get the similarity graph.
Then, it applies a Fast Unfolding community detection algorithm to find the most relevant clusters
based on the modularity value. TAINT then uses each cluster to classify each phone number to a
scamming campaign. For new received complaints, TAINT computes the features only for the new
complained phone numbers and caller IDs. Afterwards, the new computed features will overwrite
the old ones in the key-value caches.
3.4.2 Front-end
The Front-end of TAINT Framework is a dashboard implemented using Joomla [18] and an interactive
data analysis using Kibana [29], a sophisticated web front-end and part of Elasticsearch [54]
ecosystem. We choose the search and analytics engine Elasticsearch as it is a scalable solution, and
provides a high quality front-end Kibana. Joomla is used in order to allow the creation of different
tabs which helps in a good user interface experience.
The collected information is indexed and stored in a way to achieve the maximum granularity.
Moreover, through the design and implementation of the digital dashboard, we expose near-real-time
analytics results to scientists, cyber risk professionals, law enforcement, etc. The digital dashboard
dynamic components are automatically updated and equipped with drill-down capabilities. The
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distribution of calls over time (per hour, day, week, month and all time) and the various analytics
are provided on the web interface in different tabs. The tabs were created using a Joomla CMS. The
primary interface depicts the various analytics including the abuser’s geolocation distribution map,
as depicted in Figure 3.6.




In this section, we present the evaluation and provide some findings of our telephony abuse analysis
framework. In this pursuit, we first present the results and evaluation of the classifiers and algorithms
on our dataset. Second, we provide statistics about telephony fraud. The aim is to answer questions
about the main static and dynamic characteristics of this dataset. Finally, we present and review some
significant detected telephony calling campaigns.
4.1 Evalution of the Algorithms
In this section, we discuss the results of the SVM classifier and the linear regression model for
badness ranking. We applied many classification algorithms for this project and only the one that
provided the best results was presented in the result subsection. Many experimental setups and a
collection of evaluation criteria have been defined, such as, the False Positive Rate (FP rate), the
True Positive rate (TP rate), and the precision. The precision and TP rate measures are extensively
used in classification. Precision is the percentage of tuples labeled as positive and that are a true
positive (TP). It can be understood as a measure of correctness. On the other hand, TP rate is the
percentage of positive tuples and can be considered as a measure of completeness [26]. Whereas, the





















The classification of the complaints were based on text mining, and to achieve a high accuracy many
experiments have been performed on the data. In our experiments we have used SVM. As provided
in Table 4.1, we can see that the execution of SVM using our selected features gave us a very high
accuracy with 98.85% and F measure with 0.98.
Furthermore, the execution of Linerar regression for badness scoring gave also a very promising
results with mean squared error of 6.4.
Run TP rate FP rate Precision F measure Accuracy
Support Vector Machine 0.989 0.002 0.989 0.988 98.851 %
Table 4.1: Results of the Classification Model on The Complaints Dataset
4.2 Statistics on Telephony Abuse Data
In order to grasp insights on telephony abuse, we have performed an analysis on the collected data.
To this end, we conducted a thorough inspection of the data to extract quantitative and qualitative
insights. The collected data spans over a period of 7 years, starting from 1st of January, 2009 to 30th
of December 2016.
4.2.1 General statistics
(1) Phone Number Counts Compared to the Number of Complaints We observed interesting
statistics, which show that 836,630 phone numbers are reported only one time, whereas 260,280
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phone numbers are reported many times. This results in a total of 5,003,873 complaints, as





Table 4.2: Complaints Details
4.2.2 Complaints Distribution
In this section, we present charts depicting the distribution of the source numbers. This section
provides insights on the calling pattern of fraudsters. First, the distribution over time demonstrates
the increasing activity of telephony abuse. Second, This will help understanding calling numbers’
patterns used by the abusers as well as their evolution over time.
The chart in Figure 4.1 depict the distribution of the complaints over time. This figure provides
insights on the trending of telephony abuse during the last years. We notice that in 2010, we recorded
less than 2500 complaints per week, and the volume kept increasing over the years to reach more
than 30000 complaints per week in 2016. This shows that criminals are adopting more and more the



























Figure 4.1: Distribution of Complaints over Time (year on the abscissa)
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4.2.3 Geographic Analysis
In order to enrich the complaint dataset, we correlate it with other telephony data sources. Our goal
is to leverage other information in our analyses, such as the geographic distribution. We mainly
use the data sources provided by Canadian Numbering Administrator [19] and North American
Numbering Plan Administration [41] to determine North American phone calls. In addition, we
rely on the recommendation of the International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (ITU-T), namely E.164, to determine the country of origin. The dataset
contains three main classes of phone numbers based on the origin location: North America, non-
geographic or toll-free, and international. It is evident that a large portion of calls come from
North America, as the complainers are mostly from the United States and Canada. The second
largest portion of calls comes from toll-free or non-geographic phone numbers, for instance phone
numbers starting with 800-xxx-xxxx. In this section, we will further explore the data to illustrate
the geo-location distribution of abusers. This helps in understanding the types of abuse and the
distribution of telephony spammers.
United States Toll-Free Canada International
61% 28.4% 3.3% 7.3%
Table 4.3: Calls Distribution Based on the Geographic Location
(1) Country-based Source Geo-location
Seven percent of the received calls have been generated from a international phone number.
There are calls, as shown in Fig. 4.3, from different countries. A big portion of the calls have
been generated from the United states, which we expected due to the low communication
cost rates - free VoIP phone calls sometimes - in the United States and Canada. There are
small portions of the calls that have been generated from Australia, Japan, etc. which shows
the international perspective of telephony complaints dataset. The geographic distribution of
numbers also provides insights about the type of malicious calls; for instance, according to
[43], long distance calls or what we call toll fraud are made to trick people to call back so that
they will be charged more on their phone bills.
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Figure 4.3: Top Source Countries
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(2) City-based Source Geo-location
Phone numbers in North America (Canada and United States) are composed of ten digits. The
first three digits are called the Numbering Plan Area (NPA), which indicate the city of the
phone number, for instance 514-xxx-xxxx is a phone number from Montreal city. In addition,
other foreign conventions, such as the Chinese phone number convention, have been used to
extract the city from the phone numbers. The four main cities from outside Canada are from
the United States. These cities are, as shown in Fig. 4.4, Florida City, New York City, West
Liberty and California City.
Figure 4.4 depicts the top cities from where the source phone calls originate. These cities
are from all over the world. We notice that a large number of calls originate from big cities
in North America. This is related to cities with a large population and big industrial corpo-



























Figure 4.4: Top Source Cities
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4.2.4 Phone Number Analysis
In Figure 4.5, we depict the top 10 reported phone numbers. Some of these numbers are invalid
and are easy to use as spoofed numbers. Others are not assigned to any person or organization. The
abusers prefer to use the later instead of assigned numbers, for which the owners are known. The
large number of complaints about these sources show that these numbers either belong to criminal
























Figure 4.5: The Most Reported Phone Numbers
4.2.5 CNAM Analysis
According to our analysis, we found that telephony abusers rely mainly on the CNAM to craft their
attacks. The fact that this feature can be easily set up by telephony users provides abusers with a
huge advantage since, with little or no effort, they can further a variety of scams. Also due to the lack






















Figure 4.6: The Most Reported CNAMs
4.3 Use Cases: Campaign Detection
In our analysis, we applied our campaign detection approach to the complaint dataset. Subsequently,
we detect many calling campaigns. Hereafter, we present a subset of the calling campaigns, which
we will discuss and analyze in the sequel. The identification of the calling campaigns is a tedious
task given the complexity of identifying similar telephony abuses. Figure 4.7 shows a network graph
representing calling campaigns. Within this graph, we have observed that some calling numbers are
shared amoung campaigns and others are specific to some campaigns. In Table 4.4, we present some
of the top discovered calling campaigns, as well as the number of complaints related to each one of
them. In addition, we provide the first and last time of when the campaign appeared. We show in
Figure 4.8, a word cloud, which illustrates the topics of the complaints campaigns. In the following
section, we present more details on some of the top detected campaigns.
Tax Fraud Campaign
One of the big calling campaigns that we discovered through our approach is the tax scam calling




Detected Campaign # complaints First Seen Last Seen
Fraud
Campaigns
Treasury Department / IRS /
Department of Legal Affairs
26,024
2010-01-05 2016-04-24
Canadian Revenue Agency 1,961 2011-05-04 2016-01-30
Air Canada 327 2013-10-10 2016-01-14
Federal Express (FEDEX) 3,496 2015-12-19 2015-12-24






Microsoft Windows 13,154 2010-02-15 2016-04-24
Clearing House Publishers 1,943 2014-12-15 2016-04-15
Credit Card Services 5,638 2010-01-05 2016-04-20









Caribbean Cruise Lines 340 2010-02-02 2016-03-27
Global Lifestyles 390 2014-02-08 2015-11-30
America West 272 2012-02-08 2016-04-06
Powerball Lottery 24 2015-11-28 2015-12-09
Carnival Cruise line 104 2010-04-27 2016-04-19
Can you hear me? 5,638 2010-01-05 2016-04-20
Nigerian Scam 472 2014-12-16 2015-11-21
Vanuatu Scam 27 2015-03-07 2016-01-12
Prize Notification Center 315 2014-11-13 2016-04-05
Bahamas Cruise 4,222 2010-01-02 2016-04-21
Table 4.4: Subset of the Detected Calling Campaigns
data. This campaign targets American citizens since the callers are pretending to be either from the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the U.S. Treasury, or the Department of Legal Affairs. A similar
type of campaign is found targeting Canadian citizens since the callers are claiming that they are
from Revenue Canada or the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA).
IRS Scam. Using our framework, we uncovered a telephony abuse campaign where the victims
reported that the person calling them was claiming that he/she was from the Internal Revenue
Service, the U.S. Treasury, or the Department of Legal Affairs. According to the complaint messages,
the victims reported that the callers harassed them to immediately pay a tax that they owe to the
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Figure 4.7: Graph of the Detected Campaigns in 2016
government via wire transfer or check, otherwise the police would come to their home or some of
their governmental papers would be revoked. An example of these messages were: [...]I am officer
Lauren Matthew from Internal Revenue Service, and the hotline to my division is 415-992-8009, I
repeat, it’s 415-992-8009. Don’t disregard this message and do return the call before we take any
action against you. Good bye and take care![...]. Furthermore, we find that fraudsters are calling
from different numbers several times claiming to be from the IRS. Fraudsters spoofed the caller
identification of the organizations mentioned previously. They took advantage of the possibility of
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Figure 4.8: Campaigns Topics Word Cloud
spoofing their caller identification to be one of the entities mentioned previously. In the Tables 4.5,
we give the top used phone numbers that were calling along with their badness score as well as the
top CNAM used in this campaign. This is used to detect the patterns of this campaign. We found that
the first number, +1-213-**1-**63, was from Washington and has been calling victims under the
name of the IRS 679 times between the 29th of June 2010 and end of 2016. This enormous number
of calls from different numbers claiming to be the same person is an indicator of a dangerous calling
campaign that must be dealt with. The IRS scam campaign was reported 26,024 time. According to
our dataset, this campaign has been active using different source numbers since the first day of our
data, January, 1st 2010, to April, 24th 2016. In 2010, TAINT recorded 14,876 complaints about the
IRS scam campaign, with an average of 35 complaints per day. In 2016, the number of complaints
increased to reach 22,025 complaints with an average of 356 complaints per day.
Canadian Revenue Agency Scam. In this detected campaign, abusers have been calling Canadians
while impersonating as the officers at Security Investigations Department of CRA and attempting to
steal the victim’s money or personal information. The victims also complained about receiving a
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Dpt Legal Affair 17
IRS officer 14
IRS Investg dpt 9
IRS Investigate 9
IRS Audit Dpt 9
Teasury Dpt 8
IRS Washington 8
Table 4.5: Top 10 Phone Numbers and CNAM used in the IRS Calling Campaign













Canada Reven Ag 110
Revenue Canada 24
Canadian Rvn Ag 8
Canada Revenue 8
Gvt of Canada 3
Canada Reven S 3
CRA Vancouver 3
CRA Canada 3
Offices of CRA 2
Table 4.6: Top 10 Phone Numbers and CNAM used in the CRA Calling campaign
voicemail for the investigation from a set of numbers provided in Table 4.6, and they were asked to
call back otherwise they would be arrested. We believe that raising awareness and informing people
about this scam is something that should be taken into consideration. According to our data, this
scam has been targeting people since 2010. Scammers used 626 distinct phone numbers to launch
their attacks. Ottawa topped the list of the sources from where these numbers are generated with 145
different numbers which are involved in 1430 complaints. Considering our sample size, the high
number of complaints, being 19,046 complaints, compared to the population of Canada shows that
this is a very serious threat. We should also consider that there are many victims who, despite being
scammed and having paid out money, do not make complaints, as well as individuals whose personal
private information gets stolen and they remain unaware that they have been scammed. The theft of
personal information can be dangerous and may be used by fraudsters for other criminal activities.
The criminals used phone numbers and spoofed Caller Identification Name (CNAM) presented in
Table 4.6 to craft their attacks.
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Win Tech Supp 24
Win Tech Dpt 18
Windows Supp 18
Mcft Win Supp 16
Microsoft Sec 12
WindowsMicrosft 10
Win Ser Center 10
Table 4.7: Top 10 Phone Numbers and CNAM used in the Microsoft Scamming Campaign
Telemarketing Scam.
For many decades, telephony abusers have been spoofing telemarketing companies. Fraudsters
call customers and claim that they are from a given company and try to sell products cheaper if
the customer pays immediately, or attempt to steal customers’ bank information or even access
customers’ computers (such as in the Microsoft Windows technical support scam). Hereafter, we
provide more details and insights about one of the most severe telemarketing campaigns.
Microsoft Windows Scam. Criminals have gone from using simple telephony scams to more
sophisticated scams. Fraudsters usually try to social engineer their victims in order to coerce them
into divulging personal information or to pay an amount of money; however, fraudsters have now
started using different tricks to achieve their goals. For a better and more efficient scam, scammers
claim to be from a well-known company whose product is used by a maximum number of people to
obtain better results. For instance, according to our results, a significant calling campaign has been
spoofing Microsoft Windows in the past few years. Scammers claim that the victim has a problem
with their product, has downloaded a dangerous virus, or has been hacked and attempt to gain access
to the victim’s computer. The scammers then use this privilege to steal the victim’s information or
to use their computer as a botnet node or for other malicious use. We identified 364 distinct phone
numbers that abused 13,154 telephone customers. The phone numbers from where the calls were
coming and the Caller Identifications that were used in these calls are presented in Tables 4.7.
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Credit Card Ser 24
US Bank 6
VISA CARD SER 4
FIA Card Ser 4
OA Credit Card 3
Barclays card S 3
Card Member Ser 3
Discover Card Ser 2
redit Card Ser 2
Card Monitoring 2
Table 4.8: Top 10 Phone Numbers and CNAM used in the Credit Card Services Scamming Campaign
Credit Card Service Scams. We identified ten credit card services fraud campaigns resulting in
5,638 complaints. Customers received calls from fraudsters claiming that they are from cardholders
services in order to steal victims’ private bank information or to make victims pay a fee for a
fake service. Other scammers have been telling their victims that their credit card account has
been deactivated and they must provide their private information to reactivate it. Criminals usually
use robo-calling to contact customers and then get the call and try to trick people using multiple
techniques. We observed that they call various individuals numerous times and that there is a
campaign involving 523 different numbers. The criminals used phone numbers and spoofed caller
identification presented in Tables 4.8 to craft their attack.
Political Campaign.
Political parties are using phones to reach electorate and promote their campaigns. However, we
observed in our data that people are complaining about the randomness and high number of these
calls. These calls have actually turned into abuse, as people are receiving an excessively high amount
of robocalls.
Canadian Political Campaigns. Recent political calling campaigns were detected in Canada.
Many individuals have been complaining about receiving numerous repeated calls from Canadian
political parties. People have been complaining that firstly, these political parties are calling randomly
and abusing people via multiple calls, and secondly, these parties are not even bothering to put a
human on the call and are instead using a robocaller. We identified 942 complaints related to 4
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Table 4.9: Top 10 Phone Numbers and CNAM used in the Bahamas Cruise Trip Scam Campaign
different political promotion campaigns in Canada. These campaigns were active during the period
of election. The very first complaint about these campaigns was seen on February 22, 2015, and the
last complaint was seen on October 19, 2015.
Trip Scam.
Numerous calling campaigns have been reported trying to scam victims by offering them a cheap trip
or by claiming that they have won a vacation. After analyzing the complaint data, we found some of
these campaigns that will be explained in what follows.
Caribbean and Bahamas Cruise Line Scam. One of the detected scamming campaigns are the
trip scam campaigns. A set of numbers and spoofed caller identifications, depicted in tables 4.9,
have been calling people and offering them a Bahamas cruise trip; other numbers were offering a
Caribbean cruise line trips. The victims of this scam have been reporting that callers are offering
them a cheap trip if they pay immediately; others have been saying that the callers inform them that
they won a trip, but in order to get the tickets, they have to pay an amount of money and provide
their personal information. Fraudsters have been using this technique also to get people’s money
and confidential information. We observed that this campaign involves 121 numbers. Some of the
numbers were originating from the Bahamas, which indicates that either the fraudsters have been





Internet telephony technologies have enabled new types of abuses among which telephony abuse is a
prominent one. Criminals nowadays exploit extensively this channel in order to scam their victims.
Complaints about telephony scams have been dramatically increasing over the last years. Scammers
are using different characteristics of telephony networks such as caller identification and phone
number spoofing, taking advantage of the low cost and the possibility of the spamming campaign
to easily reach and deceive many telephone service customers. Different studies investigated email
spamming and developed techniques to combat it. However, with the recent advent of telephony
spamming, not enough research has been conducted on this important problem.
In this thesis, we presented TAINT, an automatic framework for the near-real-time collection and
analysis of telephony complaints to understand spammers activities and to detect telephony abuse
campaigns. The system has been evaluated on a real large-scale dataset of more than five million
telephony complaints from different sources. TAINT automatically aggregated and analyzed the
data in order to extract patterns from telephony abuse, the geo-location distribution as well as the
underlying campaigns by exploring the similarities among the abuse incidents. The performance of
TAINT components was satisfying as the classification model reached 98%, and the regression model
had an acceptable mean squared error of 6.4. In addition, TAINT detected 1, 519 different calling
campaigns that have been reported and that are causing their victims a lot of losses. We found that
most of the calls were generated from the United States and Canada, which is reasonable since the
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complaints data were mostly collected from North American customers. Furthermore, we discovered
that most of the calling campaigns were appearing continuously, such as IRS, CRA, and the technical
support campaigns; however, some campaigns depended on the events, e.g., the political propaganda
campaigns, which happened on a specific time. Some other scamming campaigns happened in a
short period of time till people became aware of that, namely, Nigerian scam, Vanuatu scam, Can You
Hear Me?. Criminals used multiple phone numbers to attack their targets, and most of the detected
scams were launched as campaigns. We observed that Caller ID spoofing was the main technique
attackers relied on to craft their attacks. Finally, the insights gained from this research enhances our
understanding of telephony abuse and our tool generates valuable intelligence that can be used to
reduce this type of abuse.
We have observed that TAINT has some limitations that could be addressed in future work. The
following presents theses limitations and suggests their mitigation.
• We implemented in TAINT a component which extracts temporal features: the daily occurrence,
the days in a week occurrence, and the hourly occurrence from the phone numbers and caller
identification. However, these features can be leveraged for the detection of the different
types of telephony threats, such as TDoS, telemarketing, and debt collectors and SPIT. Such
technique would be extremely advantageous for law enforcement investigators and telephony
service operators to deal with the most serious threats more effectively.
• In our work, TAINT relied on the Caller Identification (CNAM) feature, and the text of the
complaint filled by victims to detect the different calling campaign. However, by further
manual analysis and experimentation, we found that some telephony abusers are not part of
the same campaign although they use the same schema and techniques to scam their victims,
such as, the IRS scam. Consequently, if we would add another data source with audio content
to TAINT, then it would detect the different campaigns more efficiently.
• We divided the detected campaigns into four categories: fraud, political, scam, and telemarket-
ing calling campaigns. Nevertheless, A more elaborated telephony threat campaigns taxonomy
would help in providing more refined intelligence.
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